Lecciones de las subastas de derechos de explotación de pozos petroleros de Estados Unidos para Venezuela: una aproximación

María Fernanda Fuenmayor Sánchez; Victoria Eugenia Rivero Gómez

doi:10.58479/cu.2025.193

Authors

María Fernanda Fuenmayor Sánchez Universidad Metropolitana de Caracas (Venezuela)
Victoria Eugenia Rivero Gómez Universidad Metropolitana de Caracas (Venezuela)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.58479/cu.2025.193

Keywords:

bayesian nash equilibrium, exploitation rights, auctions, sealed-bid auctions, oil, venezuelan energy sector

Abstract

This research explores the potential for Venezuela to adopt the oil exploitation rights auction model as implemented in the United States. The study examines the dynamics of auctions in the U.S. context, applies the Bayesian Nash equilibrium to understand bidders’ strategies, and proposes an efficient mechanism for the allocation of exploitation rights in Venezuela. The objective is to provide practical and theoretical recommendations that can enhance the efficiency, transparency, and competitiveness of the Venezuelan oil sector, thereby promoting investment and optimizing resource management.

Author Biography

María Fernanda Fuenmayor Sánchez, Universidad Metropolitana de Caracas (Venezuela)

Economist and Engineer with experience in corporate finance and academic teaching. Professor of Microeconomics with a strong background in analytical modeling, financial evaluation, and decision-making applied to organizational and economic systems.